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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mêt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Religion und Entwicklung. H. SIEBECK. *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.*, CXXIII, 1, pp. 62-74; 2, pp. 151-162.

This article consists of two parts. The first consists of a summary of Eucken's *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* (Leipzig, 1901), the second of some supplementary considerations by the author. The crowning point of religion, which at the same time lays bare its problems, Eucken conceives to be attained, when it reveals to man in his temporal an eternal existence and a supermundane sphere, and offers him a knowledge of the divine essence and will. With this is involved the conviction that religion can be born in the soul of man only on condition of a 'world flight,' which has as its aim not the perfection of man in his humanity, but a union, in some way, of the human and the divine. The problems that here present themselves are: (1) Whether the positive moment, *i. e.*, the exaltation of the human to the divine, is possible; and (2) whether the negative moment, *i. e.*, the negation of the world, is necessary. Among historical religions Christianity has in its favor that it unites the negation of the world with its renewal; but for that very reason it often appears too narrow to contain the wealth of reality, especially as in the progress of history a greater and greater resource of goods, including spiritual, is developed; also because it has made its most problematic dogma, *viz.*, the union of the human and the divine, of central importance. The old problems of the origin and destiny of man, of the conflict between his strivings and his limitations, between the ideal and the actual, from which religion has drawn nourishment, have not been settled in the development of modern thought, and make necessary a complete reconsideration of life as a totality, of its ultimate foundations and its total structure. We may thus discover whether religion is a necessary phenomenon, and what are its peculiar problems.

The fundamental fact which meets us at the outset is that the life of the soul reveals itself as the operation of two opposing elements ; it is, on the one hand, a mere continuation of the nature surrounding us, on the other, it shows new powers, ends, and forms which introduce us into a new kind of existence. Here the questions of the end of activity, of freedom within limitation, of the meaning of life, inevitably arise. In case we are not content with the mere recognition of these problems, it behooves us to recognize a new world of reality, of which man is from the beginning part and parcel, and in which he is able to realize, not an alien existence, but his own true being, to conceive a spiritual substance superior to temporal change, an eternal substance or self which imparts to temporal change its content and worth. The recognition of this eternal order over and opposed to this immediately given reality, yet present in it and touching it at every point, conditioning within it a 'new life,' is the very basis of religion. This view, however, which religion offers, while sublime and inspiring, does not offer a complete solution to the problems of imperfection, guilt, and sin ; it rather affords an outlook toward an ideal than the conclusiveness and comfort of certainty. From these doubts religion emerges in its positive forms, where it appears not as a mere theory, but as a concrete and vitalizing power. The human spiritual life is not a mere product of growth from which there is no escape, but needs the coöperative activity of spirit at every point. It is, in one sense, a part and stage of the evolutionary process, yet, in another sense, essentially different from it. The difference between the lower stages and the highest stage are best shown as follows. The lowest stages of the evolutionary process are (1) the inorganic ; (2) the organic, which cannot be fully explained by the mechanical laws governing the first ; the highest stage of the organic is (3) the psychic, characterized by consciousness, conditioned by the former stages, yet representing itself as knowing the natural and as superior to it ; (4) the specifically spiritual, which in its turn is conditioned by the psychic, but recognizes itself as superior to it. The characteristic mark of this stage is that its growth is not conditioned by the inevitable laws of nature, but that it is recognized as a possibility and a task to be achieved. Blind impulse gives place to conscious purpose. The end reveals itself as spiritual and consists in the recognition of an 'over world.' It gives unity to the whole process, which, though temporal, has the supra-historical, the eternal and divine, locked up within it. The evolutionary process is free, and can take place only through opposition ; whence follow important consequences for the problems of theodicy.

EMIL C. WILM.

The Passing of Scientific Materialism. C. L. HERRICK. The Monist, XV, 1, pp. 46-86.

The aim of this article is to show the inadequacy of both the hypothesis of plenism and the dominant atomic theory, when confronted by the demands of modern science, and to urge the reconstruction of atomism in

terms of energy. In the introductory paragraphs, it is pointed out that the necessary forms of thought, space, time, and mode, lead to the conception of a unitary external world. Science is unable to give any adequate expression of the reality of the external world, but is forced to assume it to be unitary, continuous, and dynamic. All attempts at scientific construction of the world fall under three heads: atomism, plenism, and energism. The author next gives an historical account of the development of atomism from Democritus to the present day. In general, atomism means the conception of substance as composed of discrete and indivisible units, and is the result of an arithmetic type of thought. The modern hypothesis of atomism may be traced to the speculations of Newton and Dalton, which were largely inspired by the discovery of the relations between volume and mass in gases. The further development of the theory was carried out to meet the demands of chemical problems. To chemistry is due the conception of the molecule as a complex of atoms in definite relation, of atomic weights, and of an ultimate unit underlying both the molecule and atom. This last assumption is further borne out by certain phenomena of electricity and radio-activity. Of much speculative significance also are the laws of periodicity and of valence, and the correspondences between valences, atomic weights, and properties of elements. These correspondences, which are all in terms of force and energy, would seem to indicate that the concept of the atom as a bit of matter is inadequate. The insufficiency of the atomic hypothesis becomes more apparent when applied to the problems of physics. The phenomena of the transmission of radiant energy have necessitated the assumption of an imponderable and continuous ether, which is fundamentally incompatible with the conception of the atomic constitution of the universe. Attempts at reconciliation are resulting in a reconstruction of the concept of the atom as a vortex ring or a center of etheric strain. Finally, the recent discovery of such elements as radium, and of new forms of radio-activity, have made the old concept of the atom no longer tenable, and are rapidly forcing scientific speculation in the direction of energism. The author next takes up the hypothesis of plenism. The difficulties inherent in atomism, notably the problem of action at a distance, have led a certain type of mind to take refuge in plenism. The conception of a space-filling substance dynamic in character is found as far back as Anaximander. In modern times plenism has been adopted in the form of a continuous elastic ether to explain radiant transmission. Even if the difficulty of reconciling continuity and homogeneity with elasticity and the heterogeneity demanded by vortex motion were overcome, the author holds that this theory would have no advantage over energism. The final division of the article is concerned with energism itself. Traces of this theory are to be found throughout the history of thought. The habit of thought which makes it difficult to conceive the universe in non-material terms may be overcome, if it is remembered that the concept of matter is itself an abstraction. The great advantage of energism in the eyes of its advocates is pre-

cisely that it seeks to eliminate hypothesis and to appeal to energy, the reality of immediate experience, of which mind and matter are but partial aspects. It seeks to give a science of fact and not of hypothesis. The only possible measure of quantity must be psychologic in character. The question at once arises: What must be the nature of the psychic unit? Since no constant can be found directly, the unit must obviously be a ratio. In the last analysis, succession and change are the only subjective contributions to quantitative science. These forms, when filled by experience, give periodicity in the external world. Succession, if negated, gives co-temporaneity. The following psychologic formulæ, applied by mathematical physics, should make it possible to construe all forms of experience. (1) Sequence with identity gives periodicity = time. (2) Co-temporaneity ($0 \times$ sequence) with diversity = space. (3) Sequence with diversity = change. (4) Co-temporaneity with identity = intensity.

GRACE MEAD ANDRUS.

La sur-action. M. DAIREAUX. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 9, pp. 270-279.

At certain stages in moral life the individual sometimes experiences a shock, following a momentary loss of sense or personality, which may be considered as a halt necessary for the continuation of life. This shock is an 'acte necessaire,' which may or may not be a crime, but which is always marked by abnormal violence. These acts emanate directly from an instinctive volition resulting from a confused mental state which is characterized by moral passivity, and in which the desires are in evident disproportion to the vital energy of the individual. They are the necessary reactions which put an end to the preceding uncertainty, and which make the continuation or transformation of life possible. In short, this act is the passage from a passive state produced by certain circumstances to a state of sudden and violent affirmation. Such a passage or shock may be called a 'sur-action.' The value of such a 'sur-action' is very great. It is a leap forward, a wiping out of the past; the individual becomes a new personality, with the assurance of being able to act in the future more forcibly through this new realization of power. By being thus separated from the past, the individual is able to view it objectively and see it as it really is, free from the illusions existing for one whose life is continuous. This 'sur-action,' however, can take place without any external manifestations; the revolution may be entirely internal. A third form may be seen in the case of the individual who has a vivid representation of the outward act, but stops at the verge of its consummation. The beneficial results are, however, in each case the same.

R. B. WAUGH.

The Value of the Historical Method in Philosophy. WILLIAM KNIGHT. Hibbert Journal, II, 4, pp. 754-766.

Both methods of inquiry, the historical and the psychological, are

necessary and of almost equal value. But as the historical method was a dominant feature in the later nineteenth century thought, it is perhaps more important to appraise its value than to note its defects. No one can be blind to the service rendered to the students of philosophy who have been employing the psychological method exclusively, by this method of seeking an explanation of human experience in those antecedent states out of which it has arisen. The historical method of studying the successive systems of philosophy involves the comparative one of examining each in the light of the stage it has reached, and therefore in the light of all the rest; and, if all systems have sprung from roots of truth, the study of their evolution by this method will yield a criterion for determining their relative values. It enables us to understand the nature of causality, as well as the genesis of systems, for a mere phenomenal succession explains nothing. We must take into account the energy exhibited in the process, a causal and productive element, shaping the present and creating the future. The historical study of systems shows not only the derivation of each, but also its composite character, which the introspective method could not reveal. It keeps the inquirer from vagaries and the wanderings of his own subjectivity by showing the rise and fall of systems, and, finally, it must produce tolerance, if for no other reason than that it lends a fresh interest to the things that are superseded.

EMIL C. WILM.

PSYCHOLOGY.

The Present State of Psychology and its Relations to the Neighboring Sciences. HARALD HÖFFDING. Psych. Rev., XII, Nos. 2-3, pp. 67-77.

The possibility that analysis of thought cannot do justice to the great synthesis of reality is more patent to psychology than to any other science, because analysis in psychology is more artificial than in any other science. Nevertheless, analysis, on the basis of experiment and observation, is our only way of gaining an understanding of the mental life. We cannot explain life as a mere product of analyzed elements, yet these things bear directly upon our knowledge of concrete consciousness. An antinomy in the development of psychology manifested itself in the struggle between association psychology and the idealistic school. It became a problem of the relation of analysis and synthesis. The contrast between analysis and synthesis has a partial parallel in that between intellectualism and voluntarism. The difference between the analytic and synthetic schools depends upon the different way in which they come at the problem. Analysis must show how unity and continuity in mind are possible as well as its elements, and synthesis must account for elements in unity, and show how a consciousness of sporadic character is possible. When we go outside of psychology itself and try to give its relations to other sciences, new problems arise; for psychology has special relations with the physical sciences on one side and

with the historical and ethical sciences on the other. It is decidedly synthetic when compared with the former, and analytic when compared with the latter. What appears for psychology as an element is for physiology a complex. Mental elements are also qualitatively different from each other, while corresponding brain processes differ in intensity, direction, and combination. The difference which can be established between mind and matter is due to analysis, but reality is the great fundamental synthesis which binds them together; and parallelism is only a working hypothesis which is necessary because one can only know the world by investigating it systematically. Psychology is analytic when compared with historical and ethical sciences, because it treats of the elements and general laws of mental life which lie at the root of all human works and ideals. For this, the individual as well as human institutions must be studied, for there is no general mental life.

J. H. COFFIN.

De la nature du sentiment amoureux. Jankélévitch. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 10, pp. 353-378.

The sentiment of love has suffered sad confusion as to its place. Those who hold psychical manifestations to be reducible to purely physiological tendencies,—and they are not a few,—can see nothing in it other than ‘the exchange of two fancies and the contact of two bodies.’ In other words, it is merely a sexual instinct, such as is found among all animals. It is true that in civilization there are certain conventions, traditions, interests, routines, etc.; and, as a result, woman, being able to satisfy the sexual need, becomes an end in herself and thus men seem to seek her. But after all, it is the resistance, impatience, and exasperation born of obstacles—conventions and traditions—that we dignify with the name of love. Love, such as the poets and novelists write about, is a morbid sentiment foreign to a normal man, for in him there is only a sexual desire. He seeks to satisfy this by the first means, as he does hunger and thirst. But how can love thus defined explain why a *single* individual should be selected? Simply because one individual arouses and excites passion and desire more strongly than others, and hence can best satisfy the needs of the organism. Again, there are those who hold that love is merely a sexual appetite to extend life over the greatest possible time and space: to transfer an ephemeral and relative existence into a durable and absolute one; nature creates the illusion in the individual that he is subserving his own ends, when in reality it is for the good of the species. But obviously this is taking the result as the cause and reversing the order of the phenomena. This sort of a ‘will to be’ is found even among the animals. The fact is that love is an emotional state having its own meaning and subject to laws other than purely organic. It is, of course, conditioned by sexual appetite and instinct. But it differs from other instincts in that it is conditioned by a fully developed organism. A word should be said about religious and what is called Platonic love. Religious love is an aspiration for the universal

with all particular loves synthetized into a single one. It is not an intelligent love, but of the same origin as the sexual love. It thinks there is no physical act which can satisfy it; and it is with the purpose of elevating and purifying it that individuals seek to silence the demands of the flesh. Platonic love is not exclusively a sentiment, and sees no opposition between the demands of the flesh and the appetite for the absolute. This is the love which actuates all great productions in art and literature. To return to the ordinary type; men and women live either in happy, tranquil, married life or in sexual spasm, hysteria, and curiosity; and this curiosity and organic need goes, all too often, by the name of love. Those who live in love, love not a mythological nor an abstract ideal, but a real being. With the instinct of love comes the realization of self, beauty, and nature. In seeking this love, individuals seek themselves, for the one loved is the exterior projection of one's sentiments and aspirations. There are some, too, whose love may be likened to genius, with which only chosen ones are endowed. Those who love thus must be credited with a special temperment, like the æsthetic or musical temperment,—a reality with its own proper value.

J. H. COFFIN.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

L'immoralité de l'art. F. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 12, pp. 553-582.

Morality is the most complete possible systematization of the whole of life. Science, philosophy, economic industry, and religion are subordinate to the general end of morality. But art is not thus subordinate; it is an independent systematization of selected elements of reality, and their erection into a fictitious world more perfect, within its limitations, than the world of reality. Art isolates us from life. Like all other intellectual or practical activity, it springs from a dissatisfaction with the world; but instead of attempting to make the world better, art sets up its fictitious world outside of and in opposition to it, thus serving only to accentuate the evils of life. Literature, for example, opens up to us a realm of imagination where we can with facility experience the most heroic and the most subtle feelings, accomplish the most glorious deeds, and comprehend the most sublime mysteries. Idealistic art detaches us from life by spoiling our taste for it. Realistic art arouses the common feelings of human life, and wastes them upon a merely subjective world. By all the refined devices of technique, art strives to render its fictions more and more a substitute for living reality. Where the artist devotes his skill to the service of morality, it is not as an artist but as a man that he does so. The essential immorality of art appears equally in a certain æsthetic attitude toward reality; as when a philosophy, a religion, or a commercial enterprise is admired as if it were a fiction, wholly apart from its actual truth or utility. A portion of reality is isolated and viewed as if it were a picture or a page of a novel. Thus to the essential contradiction of art is added a second contradiction, the refusal to accept the reality as real. This is dilettanteism, and it is the ex-

treme antithesis of morality. Art absorbs a considerable part of the serious activities of men, individual and social life being in this measure subordinated to its conscious falsity. Art gives satisfaction to many feelings and impulses which the ordinary restraints of society hold in check, and these are largely immoral; and when it plays upon moral feelings, it is because these are not sufficiently satisfied in real life. For these various reasons, moralists have often been extremely hostile to art; where art and piety are allied, it is likely to be to the prejudice of one or both. In spite of all this, art is one of the most precious of human possessions.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

Psychologische oder kritische Begründung der Ästhetik? JONAS COHN.

Ar. f. sys. Ph., X, 2, pp. 131-159.

All the generalizing sciences may be divided into two main groups; the first regards its objects without regard to our purposes and valuations (psychology), the second presupposes these and regards its objects according to the relations which they bear to the attainment the purposes presupposed (technical sciences). But, in the third place, an end of action as such can become object of scientific investigation; *i. e.*, the question can arise whether it has a right to be an end, in what this right consists, etc. (sciences of worth). These take for granted, not only that there are worths, but that a claim to their validity may be made or disputed. That the æsthetic constitutes a worth has been denied by Witasek for the reason that pleasurable feelings attach immediately to the perception of the beautiful, while we cannot speak of valuations unless existential judgments underlie the feelings. Of course we value beautiful objects, but such value-judgment is not the characteristic mark of the æsthetic, but just the immediate feeling. In this Witasek is doubtless right. The concept 'judgment of worth' is not opposed to feeling, but to judgment of fact. Witasek grants that, while the æsthetic does not constitute value, it has value. He also conceives of the possibility of defining the field of the æsthetic by the character of this value. His criticism of our attempt at such definition is directed mainly at our concept of normative value (*geforderter Wert*), the determination of which is, indeed, the central point of all the present polemic, a polemic which arises largely from the radical difference of viewpoints of the critical sciences of worth, on the one hand, and psychological analysis, on the other. The main directions of psychologism are three. The first, of which K. Gross is representative, grants the necessity of supplementing psychology by metaphysics or some other non-scientific discipline, for psychology as such can have nothing to do with setting up categorical demands, though these may be grounded by it. A second group of thinkers (Lipps, Külpe, K. Lange) include demands and worth moments among the objects of legitimate psychological investigation. Psychology here becomes the all-inclusive mental science, of which logic and æsthetics are only specific branches. In his division and actual treatment of æsthetic

facts, Lipps, however, is far removed from ordinary psychologism, and is very near the true view. The attempt of K. Lange to discover a criterion for the determination of values by aid of the Darwinian hypothesis is a deserved failure. The third group, represented by R. Eisler, starts with a psychology freed of all worth concepts, and carries its method to its legitimate consequences in the destruction of all æsthetical concepts. Neither of the schools noticed has attempted the fundamental problem of æsthetic science, viz., the formulation and proof of the categorical character of the æsthetic norm. The mere recognition of a worth in a particular individual is a sufficient motive for an attempt on his part to realize the valued object. But there is no reason as yet for an expectation that that worth will be recognized by another. Where, however, such an expectation exists we speak of an obligation. Not only do we constantly impose such an obligation on others, but we recognize it for ourselves in the æsthetic sphere as well as in the sphere of knowledge, when a judgment is believed to have objective validity. Obligation in any sphere usually means the demand for a certain action on the ground of an expected recognition of worth. Of a worth that is thus imposed we say that it has an over-individual, a normative character, or that it is demanded. Though this normative character is not susceptible of formal proof, it must be recognized by any one who sees in the beautiful something other than the merely agreeable, who recognizes the culture value of art, and the possibility of obtaining recognition for the rightly valued, of giving to the over-individual demand a broader empirical generality.

EMIL C. WILM.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Zur geschichtlichen Bedeutung der Naturphilosophie Spinozas. A. HOFFMANN. Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr., CXXV, 2, pp. 163-186.

It is too often held that the geometrical form of Spinoza's *Ethics* is largely due to the influence of Descartes. Descartes himself, realizing the difficulty of applying such a method to metaphysics, openly disapproved this geometric form, and only employed it in a small portion of his work at the request of his opponents. We must rather look to another source for influence, namely to Hobbes. Clearly influenced by Euclid, he sought to apply the mathematical form to Ethics and Politics as the only exact method. Now Spinoza, as we know, possessed certain portions, if not all, of Hobbes's "Elementa Philosophica," hence he must have been familiar with Hobbes's Methodology. Furthermore, he was more or less removed at this time from Descartes's doctrines, so it is safe to assume that his fondness for geometrical form came rather from Hobbes. The similarity between the two is easy to trace. Each thinker was most exact and painstaking in detail. Hobbes made natural science the basis of his Politics, while Spinoza saw in it the means to human perfection. For both, then, natural science was only a means to an end. Descartes, on the other hand, valued knowledge for its own sake. Turning now to Spinoza's

general views on natural philosophy, we find him at first completely under the influence of Descartes. Mind and body are quite distinct, and can be brought into relation only by the animal spirits. A radical change came later, however. Mind and body are mere attributes of a single substance ; such an hypothesis as Descartes's has no meaning. Here we may again note the influence of Hobbes. In spite of his evident dualism, the primary substance was for Descartes the mental, while for Hobbes the body alone was real, mind being only an accompaniment. Seeing the faults of these two extreme views, Spinoza took a middle ground, that of psychophysical parallelism. In his views on freedom, we find Spinoza in complete opposition to Descartes. For the latter the laws of mathematics and physics are results of the free will of God ; they are invariable simply because God is unchangeable. Now man, being made in God's image, is also free. For Spinoza, on the contrary, man only thinks himself free, because the determining causes of his actions are hidden. Both he and Hobbes define as free that which follows from the mere necessity of inner nature. In his view of teleology, too, Spinoza is in closer relation to Hobbes. In natural science, however, we find less originality in Spinoza, and more relation to Descartes. His theory on the subjectivity of the sense organs is taken bodily from Descartes. Both view organic nature as merely mechanical. In physics, too, Spinoza is very closely allied to Descartes in theory, though he is much clearer in exposition. Neither admits the possibility of empty space, and both agree that bodies are differentiated merely by differences in position and motion. Both agree, too, in the law of inertia ; Spinoza, however, went farther than Descartes, and extended its application to the mental world.

R. B. WAUGH.

The Conception of Experience in its Relation to the Development of English Philosophy. T. M. FORSYTH. *Mind*, 51, pp. 394-409.

English philosophers have characteristically insisted that their systems were founded on observation and experience, but their presuppositions as to the general character of experience have undergone a gradual development. For Locke the sources of experience are two, sensation and reflection, the mind being passive in both. Hume derives all experience from impressions ; passively received, discrete ideas are the sole objects of knowledge. Reid rejects this theory of ideas, maintaining that the object of knowledge is always immediately known, and is always other than the idea in which it is known. Hamilton distinguishes consciousness as fact (immediate knowledge) from consciousness as truth (mediate or reasoned knowledge), and seeks to establish the validity of the former as more direct and certain than the latter. Both Reid and Hamilton take judgment, not the idea, as primary, but at the same time reinstate the old abstract dualism, in the form of 'principles of reason' *versus* 'experience.' J. S. Mill declares in his *Examination of Hamilton* that immediate experience needs

no vindication, but contrasts our primitive with our present artificial consciousness; his logical writings point to a more concrete and adequate view of knowledge, but the two sides of his philosophy are nowhere harmonized. Ferrier insists on the inseparable unity of subjective and objective, but distinguishes two kinds of experience: experience of fact and of reason. Grote's view, which is on the whole that of present-day philosophy, finds in experience two inseparable aspects, fact (immediacy) and notice (reflection), distinct but indissolubly joined. Experience is always both objective and subjective, and is never to be explained in terms of anything outside itself.

F. D. MITCHELL.